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Large-Scale MIMO Secure Transmission with Finite
Alphabet Inputs
Yongpeng Wu, Jun-Bo Wang, Jue Wang, Robert Schober, and Chengshan Xiao
Abstract—In this paper, we investigate secure transmission
over the large-scale multiple-antenna wiretap channel with finite
alphabet inputs. First, we show analytically that a generalized
singular value decomposition (GSVD) based design, which is
optimal for Gaussian inputs, may exhibit a severe performance
loss for finite alphabet inputs in the high signal-to-noise ratio
(SNR) regime. In light of this, we propose a novel Per-Group-
GSVD (PG-GSVD) design which can effectively compensate the
performance loss caused by the GSVD design. More importantly,
the computational complexity of the PG-GSVD design is by
orders of magnitude lower than that of the existing design for
finite alphabet inputs in [1] while the resulting performance
loss is minimal. Numerical results indicate that the proposed
PG-GSVD design can be efficiently implemented in large-scale
multiple-antenna systems and achieves significant performance
gains compared to the GSVD design.
I. INTRODUCTION
Security is a critical issue for future 5G wireless networks.
In today’s systems, the security provisioning relies on bit-
level cryptographic techniques and associated processing tech-
niques at various stages of the data protocol stack. However,
these solutions have severe drawbacks and many weaknesses
of standardized protection mechanisms for public wireless
networks are well known; although enhanced ciphering and
authentication protocols exist, they impose severe constraints
and high additional costs for the users of public wireless
networks. Therefore, new security approaches based on in-
formation theoretical considerations have been proposed and
are collectively referred to as physical layer security [2–6].
Most existing work on physical layer security assumes that
the input signals are Gaussian distributed. Although the Gaus-
sian codebook has been proved to achieve the secrecy capacity
of the Gaussian wiretap channel [3], the signals employed
in practical communication systems are non-Gaussian and
are often drawn from discrete constellations [7–10]. For the
multiple-input, multiple-output, multiple antenna eavesdropper
(MIMOME) wiretap channel with perfect channel state infor-
mation (CSI) of both the desired user and the eavesdropper
at the transmitter, a generalized singular value decomposition
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(GSVD) based precoding design was proposed to decouple
the corresponding wiretap channel into independent parallel
subchannels [11]. Then, the optimal power allocation policy
across these subchannels was obtained by an iterative algo-
rithm. However, the simulation results in [1] revealed that
for finite alphabet inputs, the GSVD design is suboptimal. In
fact, the iterative algorithm in [1] can significant improve the
secrecy rate by directly optimizing the precoder matrix. Very
recently, for the case when imperfect CSI of the eavesdropper
is available at the transmitter, a secure transmission scheme
was proposed in [12] based on the joint design of the transmit
precoder matrix to improve the achievable rate of the desired
user and the AN generation scheme to degrade the achievable
rate of the eavesdropper. However, the computational complex-
ities of the algorithms in [1] and [12] scale exponentially with
the number of transmit antennas. Therefore, the algorithms
in [1, 12] become intractable even for a moderate number of
transmit antennas (e.g., eight).
In this paper, we investigate the secure transmission design
for the large-scale MIMOME wiretap channel with finite
alphabet inputs and perfect CSI of the desired user and the
eavesdropper at the transmitter. The contributions of our paper
are summarized as follows:
1) We derive an upper bound on the secrecy rate for finite
alphabet inputs in the high SNR regime when the GSVD
design is employed. The derived expression shows that,
when Nt > N1, in the high SNR regime, the GSVD
design will result in at least (Nt−N1) logM b/s/Hz rate
loss compared to the maximal rate for the MIMOME
wiretap channel, where Nt, N1, and M denote the
number of transmit antennas, the rank of the intended
receiver’s channel, and the size of the input signal
constellation set, respectively.
2) To tackle this issue, we propose a novel Per-Group-
GSVD (PG-GSVD) design, which pairs different sub-
channels into different groups based on the GSVD struc-
ture. We prove that the proposed PG-GSVD design can
eliminate the performance loss of the GSVD design with
an order of magnitude lower computational complexity
than the design in [1]. Accordingly, we propose an
iterative algorithm based on the gradient descent method
to optimize the secrecy rate.
3) Simulation results illustrate that the proposed designs
are well suited for large-scale MIMO wiretap channels
and achieve substantially higher secrecy rates than the
GSVD design while requiring a much lower computa-
tional complexity than the precoder design in [1].
2Notation: Vectors are denoted by lower-case bold-face let-
ters; matrices are denoted by upper-case bold-face letters.
Superscripts (·)T , (·)∗, and (·)H stand for the matrix transpose,
conjugate, and conjugate-transpose operations, respectively.
We use tr(A) and A−1 to denote the trace and the inverse of
matrix A, respectively. ⊥ denotes the orthogonal complement
of a subspace. diag {b} denotes a diagonal matrix with the
elements of vector b on its main diagonal. Diag {B} denotes
a diagonal matrix containing in the main diagonal the diagonal
elements of matrix B. The M ×M identity matrix is denoted
by IM , and the all-zero M ×N matrix and the all-zero N × 1
vector are denoted by 0. The fields of complex numbers and
real numbers are denoted by C and R, respectively. E [·]
denotes statistical expectation. [A]mn denotes the element in
the mth row and nth column of matrix A. [a]m denotes the
mth entry of vector a. We use x ∼ CN (0,RN) to denote
a circularly symmetric complex Gaussian vector x ∈ CN×1
with zero mean and covariance matrix RN . null(A) denotes
the null space of matrix A.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We study the MIMOME wiretap channel with a multiple-
antenna transmitter (Alice), a multiple-antenna intended re-
ceiver (Bob), and a multiple-antenna eavesdropper (Eve),
where the corresponding numbers of antennas are denoted by
Nt, Nr, and Ne, respectively. The signals received at Bob and
Eve are denoted by yb and ye, respectively, and can be written
as
yb = HbaGxa + nb (1)
ye = HeaGxa + ne (2)
where xa = [x1, x2, · · · , xNt ]T ∈ CNt×1 denotes the trans-
mitted signal vector having zero mean and the identity matrix
as covariance matrix, and Hba ∈ CNr×Nt and Hea ∈ CNe×Nt
denote the channel matrices between Alice and Bob and
between Alice and Eve, respectively. The complex independent
identically distributed (i.i.d.) vectors nb ∼ CN (0, σ2b INr) and
ne ∼ CN (0, σ2eINe) represent the channel noises at Bob and
Eve, respectively. G ∈ CNt×Nt is a linear precoding matrix
that has to be optimized for maximization of the secrecy rate.
The precoding matrix has to satisfy the power constraint
tr
{
E
[
Gxax
H
a G
H
]}
= tr
{
GGH
}
≤ P. (3)
In order to be able to present the basic idea behind PG-
GSVD design in the simplest manner possible, we assume
in this paper that the perfect instantaneous CSI of both the
intended receiver and the eavesdropper are available at the
transmitter in this paper. This assumption applies for the case
where the transmitter intends to send a private message to
a particular user in the system while regarding another user
as eavesdropper, i.e., the eavesdropper is an idle user of the
system [4, 5]. Based on the deterministic equivalent channel
model for the large system limit derived in [13], the PG-GSVD
design in this paper can be easily extended to the case where
only the statistical CSI of the eavesdropper is available at the
transmitter.
When the transmitter has perfect instantaneous knowledge
of the eavesdropper’s channel, the achievable secrecy rate is
given by [3]
Csec = max
tr(GGH)≤P
Rsec(G) (4)
Rsec(G) = I (yb;xa)− I (ye;xa) (5)
where I(y;x) denotes the mutual information between input
x and output y.
The goal of this paper is to optimize the transmit precoding
matrix G for maximization of the secrecy rate in (5) when the
transmit symbols xa are drawn from a discrete constellation
set with M equiprobable points such as M -ary quadrature
amplitude modulation (QAM) and Nt is large.
III. LOW COMPLEXITY PRECODER DESIGN WITH
INSTANTANEOUS CSI OF THE EAVESDROPPER
In this section, we first provide some useful definitions
which will be used in the subsequent analysis. Then, we
analyze the rate loss of the GSVD design [11] compared to the
maximal rate for finite alphabet inputs in the high SNR regime.
Finally, we propose a PG-GSVD precoder to compensate this
performance loss with low complexity.
A. Some Useful Definitions
Let us introduce some useful definitions for the subsequent
analysis.
Definition 1: Similar to [3, 11], we define the following
subspaces
Sba = null (Hba)⊥ ∩ null (Hea)
Sbe = null (Hba)⊥ ∩ null (Hea)⊥
Sea = null (Hba) ∩ null (Hea)⊥
Sn = null (Hba) ∩ null (Hea) .
Define k = rank
([
HHba H
H
ea
]H)
and hence dim (Sn) =
Nt− k. In addition, define r = dim (Sba) and s = dim (Sbe).
Therefore, dim (Sea) = k − r − s.
Definition 2: Following [3], we define the GSVD of the
pair (Hba,Hea) as follows:
Hba = Uba Σba
[ k Nt−k
Ω−1 0
]
UHa (6)
Hea = Uea Σea
[ k Nt−k
Ω−1 0
]
UHa (7)
where Ua ∈ CNt×Nt , Uba ∈ CNr×Nr , and Uea ∈ CNe×Ne
are unitary matrices. Ω ∈ Ck×k is a non-singular matrix with
diagonal elements ωi, i = 1, . . . , k. Σba ∈ CNr×k and Σea ∈
CNe×k can be expressed as
Σba =


k−r−s s r
Nr−r−s 0 0 0
s 0 Db 0
r 0 0 Ir

 (8)
3Σea =


k−r−s s r
k−r−s Ik−r−s 0 0
s 0 De 0
Ne−k+r 0 0 0

 (9)
where Db = diag ([b1, . . . , bs]) ∈ Rs×s and De =
diag ([e1, . . . , es]) ∈ Rs×s are diagonal matrices with real
valued entries. The diagonal elements of Db and De are
ordered as follows:
0 < b1 ≤ b2 ≤ . . . ≤ bs < 1
1 > e1 ≥ e2 ≥ . . . ≥ es > 0
and
b2p + e
2
p = 1, for p = 1, . . . , s.
B. Performance Loss of the GSVD Design
The precoding matrix for the GSVD design can be ex-
pressed as [11]
G = UaAP
1
2 (10)
where P = diag (p1, . . . , pNt) represents a diagonal power
allocation matrix and A is given by
A =
[ k Nt−k
k Ω 0
Nt−k 0 0
]
. (11)
For the GSVD precoder design in (10), the received signals
yb and ye in (1) and (2) can be re-expressed as
y˜b = Σba
[ k Nt−k
Ik 0
]
P
1
2 xa + n˜b (12)
y˜e = Σea
[ k Nt−k
Ik 0
]
P
1
2 xa + n˜e (13)
where y˜b = UHbayb, y˜e = UHeaye, n˜b = UHbanb, and n˜e =
UHeane.
Define N1 = rank (Hba) and N2 = rank (Hea). In the
following theorem, we analyze the performance of the GSVD
design for finite alphabet inputs in the high SNR regime.
Theorem 1: In the high SNR regime (P → ∞), for the
GSVD design in (10), the achievable secrecy rate Rsec,high
for finite alphabet signals is upper bounded by
Rsec,high ≤ N1 log2M b/s/Hz. (14)
Proof: See Appendix A.
Theorem 1 indicates that the GSVD design may result in a
severe performance loss for finite alphabet inputs in the high
SNR regime. For example, if Nt > Nr, which is a typical
scenario for large-scale MIMO systems [14, 15], the GSVD
design will cause a rate loss of at least (Nt − Nr) log2M
b/s/Hz compared to the maximal rate in the high SNR regime.
The precoder design in [1] avoids this performance loss by
directly optimizing the precoder matrix G. However, this
results in an intractable implementation complexity for large-
scale MIMO systems. Inspired by the idea of decoupling and
grouping of point-to-point MIMO channels for finite alphabet
inputs [16–18], we propose a PG-GSVD precoder design
to prevent the performance loss of the GSVD design while
retaining a low complexity in large-scale MIMOME channels.
C. PG-GSVD Precoder Design
As indicated in [18], in order to decouple the MIMO
channels into Nt parallel subchannels, the MIMO channel
matrix has to be an Nt×Nt matrix. However, Σba and Σea in
(12) and (13) are Nr×Nt and Ne×Nt matrices, respectively.
As a result, we need to add to or remove from y˜b, Σba, y˜e,
and Σea some zeros in (12) and (13). To this end, we define
yˆb =

k−r−s 0r+s ˜˜yHb
Nt−k 0

, (15)
where ˜˜yb ∈ C(r+s)×1 is composed of the last r+s elements of
y˜b. Furthermore, we define ω =
[
ω1, · · · , ωk 0T
]H ∈ CNt×1,
yˆe =
[
y˜He 0
T
]H ∈ CNt×1, nˆb ∼ CN (0, σ2bINt), and nˆe ∼
CN (0, σ2eINt). Define two diagonal matrices
Σˆba =


k−r−s s r Nt−k
k−r−s 0 0 0 0
s 0 Dˆb 0 0
r 0 0 Rr 0
Nt−k 0 0 0 0

 (16)
Σˆea =


k−r−s s Nt−k+r
k−r−s Rk−r−s 0 0
s 0 Dˆe 0
Nt−k+r 0 0 0

 (17)
where the elements of Dˆb, Rr, Rk−r−s, and Dˆe are obtained
from the following two equations[
Σˆba
]
(k−r−s+i)(k−r−s+i)
= [Σba](Nr−r−s+i)(k−r−s+i) /
√
ωi,
i = 1, · · · , s+ r (18)[
Σˆea
]
ii
= [Σea]ii /
√
ωi, i = 1, · · · , k − r. (19)
We divide the transmit signal xa into S streams and let Ns =
Nt/S
1
. We define the set {ℓ1, . . . , ℓNt} as a permutation of
{1, . . . , Nt}. Ps ∈ CNs×Ns and Vs ∈ CNs×Ns , s = 1, . . . , S,
denote a diagonal and a unitary matrix, respectively. V ∈
CNt×Nt denotes a unitary matrix. For the proposed PG-GSVD
precoder, we set G as follows
G = UaAP
1
2V. (20)
We set
[ω]ℓjℓj [P]ℓjℓj = [Ps]ii , (21)
where i = 1, . . . , Ns, s = 1, . . . , S, and j = (s − 1)Ns + i.
Based on (20) and (21), the power constraint in (3) is equiv-
alent to
∑S
s=1 tr (Ps) ≤ P .
Also, we set
[V]ℓiℓj = (22){
[Vs]mn if i = (s− 1)Ns +m, j = (s− 1)Ns + n
0 otherwise
1For convenience, we assume Ns = Nt/S is an integer in this paper. If
Nt/S is not an integer, we can easily obtain an integer Ns by adding zeros
in (16) and (17).
4Algorithm 1: Maximizing Rsec(G) with respect to Ps and
Vs.
1) Initialize Ps with
∑S
s=1 tr
(
P
(0)
s
)
= Nt and V(0)s for
s = 1, . . . , S. Set Niter and ε as the maximum iteration
number and a threshold, respectively.
2) Initialize Rsec(G)(1) based on (27). Set counter n = 1.
3) Update P(n)s for s = 1, . . . , S along the gradient decent
direction ∇PsR(G).
4) Normalize ∑Ss=1 tr (P(n)s ) = P .
5) UpdateV(n)s for s = 1, . . . , S along the gradient descent
direction ∇VsR(G).
6) Compute Rsec(G)(n+1) based on (27). If
Rsec(G)
(n+1) − Rsec(G)(n) > ε and n ≤ Niter,
set n = n+ 1 and repeat Steps 3–5;
7) Compute P and V based on (21) and (22). Set G =
UaAP
1
2V.
where m = 1, . . . , Ns, n = 1, . . . , Ns, s = 1, . . . , S, i =
1, . . . , Nt, and j = 1, . . . , Nt. Finally, we let
[xs]i = [xa]ℓj . (23)
Based on (20)–(23) and a paring scheme {ℓ1, . . . , ℓNt}, the
equivalent received signals at Bob and Eve can be decoupled
as follows
[yˆb]ℓj =
[
Σˆba
]
ℓjℓj
[xˆ]ℓj + [nˆb]ℓj (24)
[yˆe]ℓj =
[
Σˆea
]
ℓjℓj
[xˆ]ℓj + [nˆe]ℓj (25)
where
[xˆ]ℓj =
[
P
1
2
sVsxs
]
i
(26)
for i = 1, . . . , Ns, s = 1, . . . , S, and j = (s − 1)Ns + i.
From (24) and (25), we observe that the transmit signal has
been divided into S independent groups. In each group, the
equivalent signal dimension is Ns × 1. We further define
[yˆb]ℓj = [yb,s]i and [yˆe]ℓj = [ye,s]i.
Based on (24) and (25), the secrecy rate in (5) can be
expressed as
Rsec(G) =
S∑
s=1
(I (yb,s;xs)− I (ye,s;xs)) . (27)
The gradients of I (yb,s;xs) and I (ye,s;xs) with respect to
Ps and Vs can be found in [19, Eq. (22)], based on which an
iterative algorithm can be derived for maximizing Rsec(G), as
given in Algorithm 1.
For the precoder design with finite alphabet inputs, the
computational complexity is mainly dominated by the required
number of additions in calculating the mutual information
and the MSE matrix when Nt is large [13]. Considering the
decoupled structure in (27), the computational complexity of
Algorithm 1 grows linearly with SM2Ns . However, the com-
putational complexity of the algorithm in [1] scales linearly
with M2Nt . We observe that for large-scale MIMO systems
when Nt is large, the computational complexity of Algorithm
1 is by orders of magnitude lower than the algorithm in [1].
TABLE I: Number of additions required for calculating the
mutual information and the MSE matrix for the system
considered in Figure 1.
4× 3× 2 BPSK QPSK
GSVD 8 16
Algorithm 1 32 512
Algorithm 1 in [1] 256 65536
TABLE II: Number of additions required for calculating the
mutual information and the MSE matrix for the system
considered in Figure 2.
64× 48× 48 BPSK QPSK
GSVD 128 256
Algorithm 1 512 8192
Algorithm 1 in [1] 3.04e+038 1.15e+077
For the PG-GSVD design in (20), we have the following
theorem.
Theorem 2: If the inequality (k−N2)Ns ≥ Nt holds, then
we can always find a permutation {ℓ1, . . . , ℓNt} for the PG-
GSVD design in (20), which achieves Rsec,high = Nt log2M
b/s/Hz in the high SNR regime.
Proof: See Appendix B.
The algorithm in [1] is equivalent to setting Ns = Nt
in Algorithm 1. Therefore, as long as k − N2 6= 0, it can
compensate the performance loss of the GSVD design and
achieve the saturation rate Nt log2M b/s/Hz in the high SNR
regime, as shown in [1, Figs. 1, 2]. However, in this case,
the computational complexity of the algorithm in [1] grows
exponentially with Nt. This is prohibitive in large-scale MIMO
systems. For typical large-scale MIMO systems, we have
Nt > N2 [14, 15], which implies k − N2 6= 0. As a result,
by properly choosing Ns, we can reach a favorable trade-off
between complexity and secrecy rate performance.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We set σb = σe and define SNR = P/(Nrσ2b ). Furthermore,
we use Nt×Nr×Ne to denote the simulated wiretap channel.
A. Scenarios with Instantaneous CSI of the Eavesdropper
In this subsection, the elements of Hba and Hea are gen-
erated independently and randomly. Tables I and II compare
the computational complexities of the different schemes for
the systems considered in Figures 1 and 2, respectively.
Figure 1 plots the secrecy rate for the 4 × 3 × 2 wiretap
channel for different precoder designs and different modula-
tion schemes for Ns = 2. We observe from Figure 1 that
Algorithm 1 achieves a similar performance as the precoder
design in [1] but with orders of magnitude lower computational
complexity as indicated in Table I. Both designs achieve the
maximal rate Nt log2M b/s/Hz in the high SNR regime as
indicated by Theorem 2. In contrast, the GSVD design yields
an obvious rate loss in the high SNR regime. For the channels
of Bob and Eve, we have Db,1 = 0.57, De,1 = 0.81. As
explained in Example 1, the GSVD design sets p1 = p2 = 0 in
this case. Therefore, the GSVD design suffers from a 2 log2M
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Fig. 2: Secrecy rate versus SNR for the 64× 48× 48 wiretap
channel for different precoder designs and different
modulation schemes for Ns = 2.
b/s/Hz rate loss in the high SNR regime as shown in Figure
1.
In Figure 2, we show the secrecy rate for the 64× 48× 48
wiretap channel for different precoder designs and different
modulation schemes for Ns = 2. As indicated in Table II,
the computational complexity of the precoder design in [1]
is prohibitive in this case and no results can be shown. We
observe that the secrecy rate of the GSVD design is lower than
the upper bound given in Theorem 1. This is because for the
GSVD design, as indicated in [11, Eq. (12)], only the non-zero
subchannels of Bob which are stronger than the corresponding
subchannels of Eve can be used for transmission. The bi,
i = 1, . . . , s, in (6) are in ascending order while the ei,
i = 1, . . . , s, in (7) are in descending order. Therefore, a large
proportion of Bob’s non-zero subchannels may be abandoned
by the GSVD design for large-scale MIMO channels. As a
result, Algorithm 1 achieves significantly higher secrecy rates
than the GSVD design.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have investigated the linear precoder
design for large-scale MIMOME wiretap channels with finite
alphabet signals. We derived an upper bound on the secrecy
rate for the GSVD design in the high SNR regime. The derived
expression reveals that the GSVD design may lead to a serious
performance loss. Based on this, we proposed a PG-GSVD
design to overcome the negative properties of the GSVD
design while retaining an affordable computational complexity
for large-scale MIMO systems. Simulations indicated that
the proposed design performs well in large-scale MIMOME
wiretap channels and achieves substantial secrecy rate gains
compared to the GSVD design for finite alphabet inputs.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Based on (6) and (12), I (yb;xa) in (5) for the GSVD design
becomes
I (yb;xa) =
s∑
i=1
I
(
b2i pk−r−s+i
)
+
r∑
i=1
I (pk−s+i) (28)
where I(γ) = I(x;√γx + n). Therefore, for P → ∞, we
obtain
lim
P→∞
I (yb;xa) ≤ (s+ r) log2(M). (29)
According to Inclusion–Exclusion Principle [20], we know
dim (Sba) + dim (Sbe) = dim (Sba ∪ Sbe)− dim (Sba ∩ Sbe) .
(30)
For the subspaces Sba and Sbe, we have
Sba ∩ Sbe =(
null (Hba)
⊥ ∩ null (Hea)
)
∩
(
null (Hba)
⊥ ∩ null (Hea)⊥
)
(31a)
=
(
null (Hba)
⊥ ∩ null (Hea)
)
∩
(
null (Hea)
⊥ ∩ null (Hba)⊥
)
(31b)
= null (Hba)
⊥ ∩
(
(null (Hea)) ∩ null (Hea)⊥
)
∩null (Hba)⊥
(31c)
= ∅ (31d)
where (31b) and (31c) are obtained based on the properties of
intersections [21].
Also, we have
Sba ∪ Sbe =(
null (Hba)
⊥ ∩ null (Hea)
)
∪
(
null (Hba)
⊥∩null (Hea)⊥
)
(32a)
= null (Hba)
⊥ ∩
(
null (Hea) ∪ null (Hea)⊥
)
(32b)
= null (Hba)
⊥ (32c)
where (32b) and (32c) are obtained based on the Distributive
Law of sets [21] and the Rank–Nullity Theorem [22], respec-
tively.
From (30)–(32), we obtain
s+ r = dim (Sba) + dim (Sbe) = dim
(
null (Hba)
⊥
)
.
(33)
6Assuming vi ∈ CNt×1 and uj ∈ CNr×1 are the Nt left and
Nr right singular vectors of Hba, respectively, i = 1, . . . , Nt,
j = 1, . . . , Nr, Hba can be written as
Hba =
N1∑
i=1
λiuiv
H
i (34)
where λi is the singular value of Hea. For N1 < Nt, we have
null (Hba) =
Nt∑
i=N1+1
ωiviv
H
i (35)
where ωi denotes an arbitrary non-zero complex value, i =
1, . . . , Nt. Based on the property of the orthogonal comple-
ment of a subspace [23], we obtain
(
null (Hba)
⊥
)
=
(
Nt∑
i=N1+1
ωiviv
H
i
)⊥
(36a)
= null
(
Nt∑
i=N1+1
ωiviv
H
i
)
(36b)
=
N1∑
i=1
ωiviv
H
i . (36c)
Therefore, we have
dim
(
null (Hba)
⊥
)
= N1. (37)
For N1 = Nt, null (Hba) = ∅, and we obtain
dim
(
null (Hba)
⊥
)
= Nt. (38)
Combining (5), (29), (33), (37), and (38) completes the proof.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
The key idea of achieving the maximal rate Nt logM b/s/Hz
in the high SNR regime is to guarantee that all Nt signals
can be received by Bob but not by Eve. To achieve this, Ns
signals are combined into a group and transmitted along the
subchannels Rr in (16). As a result, we need to analyze the
dimension of Sba.
Based on the Inclusion–Exclusion Principle [20], we have
dim (Sba) + dim (Sn) = dim (Sba ∪ Sn)− dim (Sba ∩ Sn) .
(39)
Following similar steps as in (31) and (32), we obtain
Sba ∩ Sn =(
null (Hba)
⊥ ∩ null (Hea)
)
∩ (null (Hba) ∩ null (Hea))
(40a)
=
(
null (Hea) ∩ null (Hba)⊥
)
∩ (null (Hba) ∩ null (Hea))
(40b)
= null (Hea)∩
(
(null (Hba))
⊥ ∩ null (Hba)
)
∩null (Hea)
(40c)
= ∅ (40d)
and
Sba ∪ Sn =
(
null (Hba)
⊥ ∩ null (Hea)
)
∪ (null (Hba) ∩ null (Hea))
(41a)
= null (Hea) ∩
(
null (Hba)
⊥ ∪ null (Hea)
)
(41b)
= null (Hea) . (41c)
Since rank (Hea) = N2, we have dim (null (Hea)) = Nt −
N2. Then, based on (39), (40d), (41c), we obtain
r +Nt − k = Nt −N2. (42)
From (42), we know r = k −N2.
When (k−N2)Ns ≥ Nt, we design the PG-GSVD precoder
in (20) as follows. We set
P =


k−r−s s r Nt−k
k−r−s 0 0 0 0
s 0 0 0 0
r 0 0 diag (p1, . . . pr) 0
Nt−k 0 0 0 0

. (43)
Also, we select a pairing scheme {ℓ1, . . . , ℓNt} in (21) satis-
fying
[Ps]ii =
{
0 if 1 ≤ i ≤ Ns − 1
pj
ωk−r+j
if i = Ns
(44)
for s = 1, . . . , S, i = 1, . . . , Ns, and j = 1, . . . , r.
Based on the design in (43) and (44), in the high SNR
regime, we have
I (yb,s;xs)
P→∞→ Ns logM (45)
I (ye,s;xs) = 0. (46)
Substituting (45) and (46) into (27) completes the proof.
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